POS 282 INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW
In class today, Thursday 2/22, I distributed 2 handouts: my version of the Speelman case brief, and some hypotheticals about the Speelman fact pattern. We first talked about the Legassie case brief (due next Thursday). I clarified that you should basically ignore the Best Evidence discussion for all segments of the brief, and just deal with the Indecent Conduct issue. We went over what discrete questions the Legassie Court needed to deal with, and how it dealt with them. We looked at the exact words of the statute that were at issue. We also discussed the constitutional implications of the statute that were not addressed by the Court, but would need to be if the Court adopted a broader definition of the scope of the statute. I also went over the more specific alternative crime discussed by the Court that the state did not charge Legassie with, and the problems with proving that statute. I also clarified to the class that, even though students are usually encouraged to share information with students who missed a class, our class discussions regarding the Legassie brief are not to shared, and absent students are limited to emailing me. We then went through the Speelman case, and put it into the case brief format. I also clarified the requirements of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and a Preliminary Injunction.
The assignment for Tuesday 2/27 is a) work on your Legassie case brief; b) read over and prepare to discuss the Speelman hypotheticals; and c) read in the text pp. 38-43 (including Katko v. Briney). Also on Tuesday, I plan to give a sample test so students know the kind of questions that will be on the 3/6 exam, discuss the recent U.S. Supreme Court due process (notice) case of Jones v. Flowers, and discuss whether, now that Speelman has gotten a hearing, whether there are any actual defenses to the charges against her.
POS 484 CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
In class today, Thursday 2/22, we first discussed the Wesby outline that is due next Thursday. I went over the underlying error by the police, in that they made the arrests thinking that the D.C. Code only required being in the apartment without a right to be there, as opposed to knowing that they had no right to be there. From this argument (clarified in Ginsburg's concurrence) we saw how Ginsburg suggested reexamining the doctrine that says police actual purpose in a search or seizure is irrelevant, as decided in the case of Whren v. U.S. (also in Ginsburg's concurrence). So I talked about Whren, where drug police made a stop for a traffic infraction. This led us back to a case we had started discussing on Tuesday, Navarette v. California. In that 5-4 decision, the Court found that there was reasonable suspicion based on an anonymous tip. The police justified their belief that the crime was on-going on the supposition that the driver was drunk, even though 5 minutes of following the driver produced only flawless driving. We talked about Kyllo case (p. 483) and then we turned to Florida v. Jardines, and saw how it followed Jones in terms of protected property interest layered on top of privacy interest.
The assignment for Tuesday 2/27 is to continue work on your Wesby outline, and to read in the text through p. 493, including Safford v. Redding.
Thursday, February 22, 2018
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